Home' RTCA Documents for Review : C2 Link Systems MASPS_Draft Contents Appendix B
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Order 8000.369, Safety Management System - This order establishes the SRM
policy for the FAA. It establishes requirements for how to conduct SRM for FAA
organizations and/or ICAO State Safety Program (SSP) frameworks.
Order 8040.4B, Safety Risk Management Policy - This order establishes the Safety
Risk Management (SRM) policy for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
It establishes requirements for how to conduct Safety Risk Management (SRM) in
the FAA. It formalizes SRM guidance for FAA Lines of Business and Staff
Offices and describes specific steps when performing and documenting SRM. The
objective of SRM is to provide information regarding hazards, safety risk, and
safety risk control/mitigations to decision makers and to enhance the FAA's ability
to address safety risk in the aerospace system. SRM consists of conducting a
system analysis; identifying hazards; and analyzing, assessing, and controlling
safety risk associated with the identified hazards.
Approach to the Operational Safety Analysis30
The OSA is a qualitative assessment of the potential operational hazards derived from the
operational requirements in the OSED. The OSA was conducted to assess the potential
safety risk of the C2 Link System during normal operations for the two CONOPS and the
two associated scenarios as described in Section C.2 of the OSED.
In the C2 Link System OSA, the information exchanges (as defined in the OV-3) were
examined to identify and classify hazards that could adversely impact the safety of the UAS
operation. This assessment followed the FAA’s Safety Risk Management (SRM) process
1. Describing and bounding the system,
2. Identifying potential operational hazards,
3. Analyzing, assessing and determining their risks, and
4. Determining safety performance targets or safety objectives.
Hazards were classified according to a standardized classification scheme based on hazard
severity as documented in the FAA’s SMS Manual. Safety objectives were assigned to
each identified hazard. These safety objectives were used in the OPA to develop
requirements, which if met, would establish acceptable levels of safety performance
in the NAS.
The scenarios used to develop the requirements in this MASPS involved transit operations
at low altitude in Class B, D, E, and G airspace (described in APPENDIX B Section B.6).
The scenarios also included takeoff and landing operations in Class G and at a towered
airport in Class D airspace. The OPA attempted to find the most restrictive requirements
based on all operational factors of which airspace class was included. For example, the
latency and continuity requirements for ATC communications were based on studies
performed in Class B airspace.
The OSA was based on use cases from the scenarios developed specifically to create
realistic situations to support evaluation of the system safety impacts of C2 Link System
failures. These use cases included transit of Class E and G airspace and takeoff and landing
operations in Class D and G airspace.
30 This is from DO-364 Page 31.
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