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each asset commensurate with the threats and vulnerabilities of that particular asset and the potential
consequences of an attack. This is the heart of a ‘risk-based security’ (RBS) approach.
Airport owner/operators should consider evaluating internal and external security needs in the context of
resource constraints such as: availability of capital and competing projects and priorities; staff availability
including contract labor; development and implementation time issues including government mandates and
policies; and each project’s external factors, such as privacy, safety, legal/regulatory issues, environmental
concerns and aesthetics.
The ISSA design should address the needs of all stakeholders including airport security, operations,
maintenance, telecommunications/management information systems, public safety, upper management
staff, tenant, passenger and cargo air carriers, maintenance facilities, flight crew, fixed base operators
(FBOs), concessionaires and any other users requiring unescorted access to the secured area.
An airport owner/operator should address requirements for exclusive area agreements and tenant security
programs during the ISSA planning and system design as well. Risks posed by the effects of natural and
man-made disasters should be factored into the operational security requirements analyses. When
applicable, an existing ISSA, its components, planned life cycle and the operational needs of the airport
operator should be reviewed during the system requirements analysis and before a baseline ISSA design
concept is established. The review should include defining criteria to ensure that the next upgrade or
replacement is complementary with existing systems and equipment. Senior airport management should
be active participants in all phases of the security system design and selection process to ensure that details,
features, and limitations of system acquisition, installation, and operation are understood at this level.
Video surveillance supports PACS, some PIDS and other Information Display Systems (IDS), and SOC
functions. When video imagery is integrated with an IDS, and displayed in an SOC, it can provide essential
information for perimeter monitoring, target assessments, and incident management. When feasible, video
imaging devices could be coupled to analytic and situational awareness software in the SOC to automate
routine surveillance monitoring functions. Video storage warrants particular attention during ISSA design
because storage is often a major cost element as well as a management challenge.
Video storage is a fundamental aspect of the video management system design. Digital video storage is
recommended because it enables image enhancement, frame compression, integration with analytical
functions such as tripwire detection, rapid access to important video streams, and security measures such
as frame encryption and operator access permissions. In some cases, video processing capability may be
found at “the edge”; i.e. within the cameras, which also relieves a substantial burden on the Information
Technology (IT) system. The system design should provide for convenient, multiple factor indexing of
stored imagery so that pertinent frames can be quickly accessed based on a number of factors including
camera identification, day, date and time information, event trigger types and other considerations. The
video storage subsystem location should be transparent to operators, enabling authorized call-up capabilities
of recorded video streams. More on these and other relevant topics may be found in Section 6: Video
Establishment of a dedicated SOC represents a considerable investment for any airport owner/operator.
This infrastructure can range from a single room (with a single person-per-shift), to a large dedicated facility
(with numerous staff, round-the-clock operations, and multiple arrays of computer monitors and large wall
screens for video surveillance and information dashboards). Off-site redundancy for Continuity of
Operations (COOP) deployments in case of main facility outages is also recommended, but this may be
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