Home' RTCA Documents for Review : DO-230H FRAC Contents 170
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Lack of visible signs of a potentially dangerous vehicle.
The limited response times available for security forces to react to suspected threat conditions.
The imaging technology options discussed above for threat assessment on the perimeter, i.e., CCTV
cameras and FLIRs, also apply to roadway security.
Radars for detecting human intruders may not apply here because the physical distances to human targets
are usually short, the clutter environment is generally high, and radars do not provide detailed actionable
CCTV cameras provide the most detailed images provided so long as vehicles are properly illuminated and
fog and smoke are not present. Infrared (thermal) cameras are able to penetrate modest fog and smoke, and
mid-band imagers operating in the 3 to 5 micron band may at short ranges provide sufficient detail for
vehicle classification, but thermal imagers cannot recognize license plate details.
Candidate CCTV cameras should be tested in the actual airport environment at night to confirm that the
cameras and their lenses can perform properly, that sightline distances and curves in roadways do not
increase the number of required cameras, and that alternative solutions have been identified for conditions
of poor visibility (e.g., fog) for short sightlines.
Public transportation, including taxis, busses, and rental cars which arrive by the same terminal roadways
to operate and/or park adjacent to terminals are potential VBIED threats for the same reason. There is
currently no means to determine the intent of a vehicle operator. Load sensors in a roadway, video analytic
functions, and license plate recognition software used in conjunction with watch lists of suspicious vehicle
can assist in assessing whether a vehicle should be inspected and/or quarantined. In the case of stolen
vehicles, for example, cameras with automatic license plate recognition could match license plate numbers
to State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records or to rental airport records.
Vehicle Access Gates
Vehicle threats begin outside the fence and are typically intended to breach the perimeter to reach targets
inside the fence. Gates are more easily breached than solid fence lines – gates are designed to be opened,
although in high threat environments they may be reinforced by numerous means. Vehicle gates can also
be breached by pedestrians, either acting independently or by piggy-backing a blind spot in the driver’s
and/or guard’s field of view.
Vehicle gates may or may not be staffed by guards; unmanned gates will have to rely almost exclusively
on the access control system used to identify authorized access, coupled with the surveillance technology
to determine that the system has made a valid decision. This might include the use of biometric identifiers,
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for license plate recognition, and/or video analytics to determine
patterns of movement. Vehicle gates might also be a vector for an armed approach by means of using a
driver or the guard as hostage.
Manned guard posts raise issues about the monitoring guard positions and the safety of guards as they
perform their duties. Video of guard posts and surrounding areas should be provided for all periods when
the positions are manned, with particular attention to the placement of lighting which might blind camera
surveillance or be inadequate for the camera detector. To the extent practical and possible, guards should
be able to check an ID badge without leaving his/her guard facility.
Radars are generally not suited for gate surveillance because the physical distances are short, road lanes
present narrow areas, fencing and other built-up structures create high clutter environments. The relatively
long wavelength of radars does not enable vehicles or persons to be classified and assessed.
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