Home' RTCA Documents for Review : DO-230H FRAC Contents 169
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At the perimeter fence, the most commonly perceived threat is breach by persons on foot, either over or
through the fence fabric, or by stealth or deceit through existing access points, whether stand-alone or
staffed. These may or may not be related to vehicle threats.
Similarly, vehicle threats begin outside the fence, and are typically intended to reach through the fence to
targets inside. Attempts may occur using brute force against the perimeter, and/or stealth/deceit through
designated portals. This relates to “early warning” surveillance of approach roadways and areas adjacent to
the airfield property.
Video cameras are attractive because they perform both the detection and the assessment functions,
provided environmental conditions are favorable, and they are relatively inexpensive and highly reliable.
FLIRs complement video cameras because of their detection and assessment capabilities under conditions
of poor visibility.
Radars, especially millimeter wave radars (Ku band and above) provide an all-weather exterior detection
capability. Radar range is a complicated issue, being highly dependent on wavelength, target cross section,
and background clutter. A human target is much more difficult to detect than a vehicle, but a human carrying
a rifle has a greater cross section than an unarmed human provided the radar signals are not overwhelmed
by clutter. More on this topic may be found in Section 5: Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS).
The performance of video cameras, FLIRs, radars and other candidate sensor technologies are site and
environment dependent. Performance should be validated by testing under actual operational conditions
during the system design phase to meet operational requirements established during the ConOps phase.
Landside Terminal Roadways
Terminal roadways present serious security surveillance challenges, since they are open virtually full time
to public access by any size vehicle carrying every conceivable size and shape of cargo, or by any person
on foot with wheeled carriers. At night, headlights can blind video cameras and prevent vehicle
classification, license plate recognition, and other desirable security functions. Airport security system
design efforts must address camera selection and placement with such conditions in mind.
Of particular concern is the improvised explosive device (IED). A pedestrian wheeling an oversized piece
of baggage, golf club case, etc., could easily conceal up to several hundred pounds of explosives. Vehicles
can carry much greater loads, as the explosion of a van loaded with ammonium nitrate demonstrated in
Oklahoma City. These are known as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs).
Whereas a person moving a cart can easily enter a terminal through unsecured doors, VBIEDs will mostly
be constrained to curbside areas. Monitoring such areas at night, in the presence of roadside and terminal
lighting as well as with vehicle headlights, will be more challenging than during daytime and should be
considered during system design.
Enhanced surveillance is among the most practical answers, including such improvements as video
analytics and behavioral analysis, as well as license plate recognition. During periods of elevated threat, the
addition of vehicle search capabilities placed well before the entrance to airport facilities should also be
considered during ISSA design.
Technical solutions are complicated by:
Close proximity of passenger and concessionaire roadways to the terminal buildings.
Lack of convenient areas for screening the contents of vehicles before they enter the terminal
roadways, which is acerbated by traffic cueing and delays that prevent screening of vehicles once
in the roadways.
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