Home' RTCA Documents for Review : DO-230H FRAC Contents 105
©2017 RTCA, Inc.
To further strengthen trust in this method, the PACS include a feature that limits the number of invalid PIN
entries a system will accept. Should this limit be exceeded, the PACSs often allows a user-defined number
of attempts before a PIN tamper alarm is generated. All operator activities, including those actually
executed as well as attempted (other than those the operator is not authorized to execute) are logged into
the systems Activity Log. An example is an operator who attempts to make unauthorized changes to system
parameters. The attempt and the specific change the operator tried to make shall be logged with time, date
and name of the operator
With the PIN-to-card authentication mechanism, a card is presented to the reader and the user provides a
PIN for the card to validate. This then unlocks the card and the card releases a unique identifier. The PACS
uses this identifier to find an entry in its data base for access authorization.
This method is used in federally issued credentials (such as PIV, DOD CAC, and TWIC to name a few)
and requires a trusted method to transfer the identifier from the card to the PACS. Unless the card is a
trusted entity, the PIN presented to the card has no assurance value for the PACS. (The PACS trust in a PIV
card is obtained after a successful card cryptographic authentication is executed.)
Systems that rely on a single operational biometric often use a PIN as a back-up mechanism when certain
individuals are unable to enroll that biometric factor.
Card with PIN-to-PACS Operation
Systems that require secret information (a PIN) in addition to a unique identifier for the user achieve two-
factor authentication (‘something you have’ and ‘something you know’) when the unique identifier is
released from a hard-to-clone physical device.
Although details vary from PACS to PACS, the fundamental concept remains the same. The authentication
method includes matching both a unique identifier (such as a card number or FASC-N) and a PIN. During
the process of assigning access privileges to the cardholder, a private PIN is created and included with the
unique card number (FASC-N) and indicate access authorization in the individual’s user record. Most
PACS store and maintain user records in the PACS control panel. The user access request and PACS process
is as follows:
A user presents a card to a PACS reader.
The reader processes the card data and the cards identifier sent to the PACS control panel.
The controller uses the identifier to locate and open the user record in the database. The user record
includes a private PIN. The system then prompts the user to enter the private PIN.
The PIN is sent from the keypad to the PACS control panel for comparison (validation) against the
private PIN in the user record.
When the PIN entered matches the private PIN, the system initiates the authorization process and
makes the access decision.
To further strengthen trust in this method, both the credential and the PACS include a feature that limits the
number of invalid PIN entries a system will accept. Should this limit be exceeded, the credential locks. In
most cases, this limit is set to three incorrect entries, but can be configured to meet the airport’s ASP. PACS
often allow a user-defined number of attempts before a PIN alarm is generated.
Depending on how the card is verified and the length of the PIN, various levels of assurance can be obtained
using this two-factor authentication method. It is worth noting that the PIN is compared only to the single
Links Archive Navigation Previous Page Next Page